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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Where the university had promised to permit plaintiff to enroll in and audit 
ten courses free of charge, did the district court correctly dismiss plaintiffs claim that the 
university breached its promise or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
when university police or other employees detained plaintiff or published allegedly false 
or confidential information about plaintiff? 
The district court's ruling dismissing plaintiffs claims is reviewed for correctness. 
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, If 8, 66 P.3d 592. 
2. Whether plaintiffs appeal of the foregoing issue is frivolous within the 
meaning of Utah R. App. P. 33, such that damages, including single or double costs 
and/or reasonable attorney's fees, should be awarded to the university. 
This is not an issue for review but is a matter for original determination by the 
appellate court. Utah R. App. P. 33. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
Plaintiff Aaron Raiser is a 42-year old former student at Brigham Young 
University ("BYU" or the "University") who was banned from campus in 1996 for 
trespassing in University buildings after hours and other suspicious behavior. He was 
subsequently arrested and charged with criminal trespass for entering campus in violation 
1 
of the ban notice in 1997. Though the charges were ultimately dropped at the 
University's request, Mr. Raiser filed two lawsuits against the University in 1999 based 
on incidents that occurred in connection with his 1997 arrest. 
On July 28, 1999, Mr. Raiser agreed to dismiss all of his claims against the 
University pursuant to a settlement agreement. See "Settlement Agreement and Release" 
(hereinafter "Settlement Agreement," copy attached to Brief of the Appellant ("App. 
Br.") as Appendix A). Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the University 
permitted Raiser to register to audit1 up to ten classes at B YU. The University made no 
other promises or commitments to Mr. Raiser in the Settlement Agreement. Since 1999, 
police officers employed by the University have on various occasions detained and 
questioned Mr. Raiser in response to calls describing his suspicious or bizarre behavior. 
Also, police officers or security guards employed by the University have on three 
occasions communicated information about Mr. Raiser to reporters for the student 
newspaper or others. Based on these incidents, Mr. Raiser has filed three lawsuits against 
the University, including this lawsuit claiming that the University breached the terms of 
the Settlement Agreement or an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. None of 
the allegations of Mr. Raiser's Complaint is even remotely related to the University's 
obligation under the Settlement Agreement, however, and plaintiff has never alleged, nor 
can he allege, that the University in any way prevented him from registering for and 
1
 The term "audit" means that the person is allowed to take a course without receiving any 
academic credit. A person need not be enrolled as a student at the University to audit a 
course, and audited classes do not appear on transcripts and do not count towards the 
fulfillment of any degree requirements. 
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auditing BYU courses as promised. Mr. Raiser's Complaint was therefore dismissed by 
the district court for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Mr. Raiser filed the Complaint in this case on July 25, 2002. R. 16. On December 
23, 2002, the University filed a Motion to Dismiss the case pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. R. 82. That motion 
was granted by Judge Burningham in a bench ruling issued on March 6, 2003. R. 118. 
Judge Burningham reasoned that "a party's obligations under a contract 'cannot be 
enlarged and expanded by means of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to 
include other promises not fairly included in the promise actually made." Ruling at 6 
(quoting Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 P.2d 735 (Utah 1997)); 
R. 113. Mr. Raiser subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider, R. 133, a Motion to 
Amend Complaint, R. 152, a second Motion to Amend Complaint, R. 147, an Amended 
Motion to Amend Complaint, R. 152, and an Objection to Order as Drafted. R. 162. The 
court denied each of these motions and objections, noting that the proposed Amended 
Complaint did not cure any of the deficiencies of the original Complaint. Ruling of May 
22, 2003; R. 180. A final Order was entered by Judge Burningham on April 4, 2003. 
R. 158. On June 4, 2003, Mr. Raiser filed this appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, R. 184, 
and it was subsequently assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals on July 18, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
Although the University denies many of the allegations of Mr. Raiser's complaint, 
for purposes of a motion to dismiss, both the University and the Court must accept the 
3 
material allegations of Mr. Raiser's Complaint as true. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 
\ 2, 66 P.3d 592; Hall v. Dep't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, Tf 2, 24 P.3d 958; St. Benedict's 
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). However, the Court in 
reviewing a determination as to the sufficiency of a complaint is limited to the facts 
alleged in the complaint, and is not required to accept allegations set forth in subsequent 
pleadings or to adopt the plaintiffs legal assumptions or conclusory allegations. Franco 
v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ^  36, 21 P.3d 198. The 
following statement of facts is therefore based on the factual allegations contained in Mr. 
Raiser's original Complaint, omitting those allegations that are immaterial, conclusory, 
or argumentative: 
1. On July 28, 1999, BYU entered into a Settlement Agreement with plaintiff 
Aaron Raiser which provides in relevant part: 
BYU will permit Raiser to register to audit up to a total often 
courses offered by BYU in the Spring or Summer term of any 
year starting with 2000 and ending in 2009. BYU will waive 
all tuition costs, but Raiser will pay for books and supplies. 
Settlement Agreement; R. 2. 
2. On or about September of 1999, the University Police wrote an article 
which subsequently appeared in the school newspaper, the Daily Universe. According to 
the Complaint, the article "stated that the police had received a police call from a student 
at Wymount Terrace stating she saw a suspicious person at the Wymount chapel." The 
2
 Mr. Raiser made additional allegations against the University in an Amended 
Complaint, R. 142-41, but he does not renew those allegations in this appeal, see App. 
Br. at 7-8, and appears to rely solely on the allegations of his original Complaint. Id. at 
23. 
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person was Raiser and the article described "the car plaintiff drives [and] 
exact stats off his driver's license," then "proceeded to warn the reader to avoid this 
person ' ' Complaint"f! I l l - I"" It. 
3. At Mr. Raiser's reqi lest ai etractioi 1 of tl le article vv as printed in the sell i 3C 1 
newspaper later in the semester. Complaint ^ 19; R. I .^ 
4. Another article about Plaintiff appeared on the Daily Universe internet site 
in in IIUMII Srplnnbn '1)011 I In* IHIIIK ]I illri'nlli, i nnltiiiinl i l.ilnnnil nlli ilmtnj Ho 
ihc University Police, indicating that Raiser "had been convicted of criminal trespassing 
* 1 • v Complaint ffif 23-24; R. 1 ? 
5. "  11 'laii itiffs i ( ' ' ill in mi in (lie 
printed edition of the Daily Universe. Complaint f^ 25; R. 12. 
6. Mr. Raiser subsequently registered for and audited courses at BYU during 
thcNpimy lu »l KM I J, pniMiitni In (lit k in^o! ihc ,M,llli,nn.,nl Agreement. Complaint 
1f28;R. 11. 
7. On May 19, 2002, Mr. Raiser was stopped by BYU Security personnel 
I nii-iuli ,i I I'm >. \ I "iil\ I i lull I In w .III ii Stiiida) \'\ tiHiig a( .ippuixiiiiaki) I I hi p m,? a 
time when no classes or meetings were scheduled on campus. After a discussion with 
Mr. Raiser, the employee called University Police to the scene and Mr. Raiser was 
alleged Is Udninal loi quriliomii}.1 ( ompluinl 1| 3(a); K 111, 
8. The following Sunday, May 265 2002, B Y U Security personnel again foi ind 
Mr. Raiser inside the chemistry building. A University Police officer was called to the 
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scene and again detained Mr. Raiser for questioning about his activities. The Police 
officer allegedly told Mr. Raiser that "security had been told to report Plaintiff on sight to 
the police." Complaint ^ 29(b); R. 10. 
9. The following Sunday, June 2, 2002, someone again reported to the police 
that they had seen Mr. Raiser walking through the chemistry building. After exiting the 
building Mr. Raiser was stopped by a University Police officer. The officer allegedly 
told Raiser that he was not being detained, but that he could not leave until they had 
talked. After talking to the police officer Mr. Raiser was released. Complaint f 29; R. 
10-9. 
10. On or about June 13, 2002, Mr. Raiser was in a campus computer lab and 
overheard a BYU Security employee talking with a student. The security employee 
allegedly disclosed a number of facts about Mr. Raiser, Complaint ^ 31; R. 9, including 
the fact that Mr. Raiser had previously been banned from campus and the fact that he had 
recently been arrested for lewdness involving a child. Amended Complaint [^ 31; R. 139-
38. 
11. The student to whom these facts were allegedly disclosed was a former 
roommate of Mr. Raiser's and was in the same class with him. Plaintiff Raiser 
subsequently requested that his instructor permit him to take the final exam at a different 
time to avoid contact with his former roommate, which accommodation was granted. 
Complaint Tj 32; R. 8. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Police or Security personnel set forth in the Complaint could constitute a breach of the 
University's promise to allow Raiser to enroll in classes. In so doing, the court properly 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, to encompass the allegations of Mr. Raiser's 
Complaint or his Amended Complaint. Existing law establishes unequivocally that 
rights "cai it IC 11: be enlarged and expanded by means of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing to include other promises not fairly included in the promise u In iliv 
made." Jensen i\ Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 P.2d 735 (Utah 1997). Ihe 
Com t si lould affin n tl le I loldh lg of the district court that, as a matter of law, the 
allegations of Mr. Raiser's Complaint are not liiii'K iiu \m\v(\ \\ iilim tin; pmi t 
Raiser to register for and audit ten classes at BYU. 
I "In Kaiser ' s appea l is not war ran ted by exis t ing law. nui ,s u oa>ed on any g o o d 
faith argument to extend, modify, oi re\ erse existii lg law • •• • .sei 's appeal is 
frivolous within the meaning of Utah R. App. P. 33(b), and damages, including single or 
double costs and reasonable attorney's fees, are appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ACTIONS COMPLAINED OF ARE NOT FAIRLY INCLUDED 
IN THE UNIVERSITY'S PROMISE UNDER THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT. 
I In I1.II i i i ILiiiinms lliiil \V\ I I btnm hn l ;i Si/Klnim ml \ j»in inni l nil r nh ' h ill iiiilll > iilllli 
h i m in 1999 w h e n Un ive r s i t y Pol ice or Secur i ty pe r sonne l de t a ined h i m at va r ious t imes 
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or published allegedly false or confidential information about him. He has admitted, 
however, that the actions of BYU employees did not breach any express terms of the 
Settlement Agreement. See "Response to Motion to Dismiss complaint" at 6; R. 96; see 
also App. Br. at 22. Nevertheless he maintains, as his sole argument on appeal, that the 
actions of BYU employees violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in 
the Settlement Agreement. See App. Br. at 9. 
As a general rule, every contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, under which both parties to a contract promise not to "intentionally or 
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the 
fruits of a contract." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 
(Utah 1991). This "implied" covenant is construed strictly, however. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: "[W]e will not interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing to make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves. Nor will 
we construe the covenant 'to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon 
by the parties.5" Malibu Inv. Co., v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, ^ 19, 996 P.2d 1043 {quoting 
Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998)) (other citations omitted). The test 
articulated by the Supreme Court is that a defendant's commitment under a contract 
"cannot be enlarged and expanded by means of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing to include other promises not fairly included in the promise actually made." 
Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 P.2d 735 (Utah 1997) (emphasis 
added). Mr. Raiser's Complaint is insufficient to state a claim of breach of the implied 
covenant because none of BYU's actions alleged in the Complaint could fairly be 
8 
included within the University's promise under the Settlement Agreement to permit Mr. 
Raiser to audit courses at the University. 
A. A PROMISE TO REFRAIN FROM MONITORING OR DETAINING 
MR. RAISER IS NOT FAIRLY INCLUDED WITHIN THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
Mr. Raiser claims that BYU breached its Settlement Agreement with him when on 
three occasions he was detained by University Police or Security personnel, allegedly 
without cause. Complaint f^ 29; R. 11. These allegations, even if true, would not 
constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith, because a promise to refrain 
from such activity cannot fairly be included within the University's promise to permit 
Mr. Raiser to audit classes. 
Nowhere does Raiser allege that he was prevented from attending or otherwise 
participating in classes because he had been detained by University Police. Moreover, he 
cannot plausibly make this claim, because, according to the Complaint, University Police 
stopped Mr. Raiser around midnight on May 19, 2002, which was a Sunday night, and 
again the following two Sundays. Complaint f 29; R. 11-10. Obviously, University 
3
 While Mr. Raiser claims that he was detained and questioned without cause, BYU 
Police officers in fact had a number of reasons to monitor Raiser's behavior, some of 
which are indicated in his own pleadings. Raiser's pleadings indicate that the times he 
was stopped were after he was seen lingering in University buildings or other areas of 
campus, often late at night, on Sundays, a time when no classes are in session and very 
few students are present. See Complaint Tf 29; R. 11-10. Combined with this fact are the 
facts, also indicated in Raiser's own pleadings, that Raiser (i) had been previously banned 
from campus for trespassing in University buildings after hours, (ii) had been arrested for 
criminal trespass in violation of that ban, and (iii) had more recently been arrested for 
lewdness involving a child. See Response to Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 3; R. 99. 
Under these circumstances the University Police arguably had a duty to stop Mr. Raiser 
and inquire as to his business. 
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classes are not in session at these times. 
The most Mr. Raiser can claim is that these encounters with University Police 
created "an atmosphere in which plaintiff can not study/5 Complaint Tflj 49, 54; R. 11-12, 
and that "the academic environment requires some degree of solitude and should be a 
place where a student can concentrate on their studies." App. Br. at 12. While this may 
be true to some extent, the solitude afforded students does not extend to their being 
permitted to roam at will and unquestioned through the basement of the chemistry 
building on a Sunday night near midnight. More importantly, there is nothing in the 
Settlement Agreement that guarantees that Mr. Raiser will find the "atmosphere" or 
"environment" of BYU Campus conducive to his study habits, or that he won't be 
bothered by the actions of University employees. These expectations are simply not part 
of the agreement and cannot form the basis of an action in contract. 
The University did not, through the Settlement Agreement, contract away its 
responsibility to patrol the campus and to monitor suspicious behavior or individuals. 
BYU must be allowed to protect its students from risk. The University's commitment 
under the Settlement Agreement to permit Raiser to audit University courses cannot be 
expanded to include a promise to refrain from stopping him or questioning him when he 
is found roaming through empty buildings late at night, at a time when no classes are in 
session and very few students are on campus, and where the University has knowledge of 
the fact that he has been recently arrested for crimes of a sexual nature. See R. 11-10, 99. 
The University never would consent to such a limitation on the actions of its police and 
10 
security officers as part of the express terms of any settlement agreement; it should not be 
held to such terms as an implied covenant. 
B. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CANNOT BE EXPANDED TO 
INCLUDE A PROMISE TO RESTRAIN UNIVERSITY 
EMPLOYEES' SPEECH ABOUT MR. RAISER. 
Mr. Raiser next claims the University breached the settlement agreement through 
two allegedly defamatory articles written by the staff of the Daily Universe, a campus 
newspaper, in September of 1999 and 2000,4 and by statements allegedly made by a 
BYU Security employee. Complaint ffif 13-25, 31; R. 14-12, 9. Mr. Raiser gives no 
explanation as to how the articles prevented him from attending classes, and it is hard to 
imagine how the articles could have interfered with Mr. Raiser's ability to attend classes, 
as the Settlement Agreement permitted him only to audit courses during Spring and 
Summer terms, and both of these articles allegedly appeared in Fall Semester. See 
Complaint fflf 13-25; R. 14-12; Settlement Agreement ^ 2; R. 2. Further, it is clear from 
the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint that the appearance or near appearance of 
these articles in 1999 and 2000 did not, in fact, prevent Mr. Raiser from registering for 
and auditing courses as promised under the Settlement Agreement, because he in fact 
registered for and audited classes at BYU, as permitted by the Settlement Agreement, 
subsequent to the publication of these articles. Amended Complaint f^ 29; R. 141. 
4
 According to the Complaint, the first article does not mention Mr. Raiser by name and 
was retracted by the University at Mr. Raiser's request, Complaint |^ 19; R. 13, and the 
second article was withdrawn, also at Mr. Raiser's request, before it was even printed. 
A/.f 23;R. 12. 
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More importantly, however, just as the University's commitment to permit Raiser 
to audit courses under the Settlement Agreement does not limit the law enforcement 
actions of University Police, likewise it cannot be expanded into a limitation on the 
speech of University personnel. Raiser argues that the fact of his ban from campus and 
his arrests for criminal trespass and lewdness involving a child should have been kept 
confidential. App. Br. at 8, 14. However, nothing in the Settlement Agreement addresses 
confidentiality, and in fact there can be no expectation of privacy with regard to an arrest, 
which is a matter of public record. The commitment Raiser seeks to impose on the 
University is wholly unrelated to the promise it made in the Settlement Agreement to 
permit Raiser to audit classes. Because the University did not agree, in settling the 
previous lawsuits, to restrain the speech of its employees, such a contractual commitment 
cannot be imposed upon it through the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
C. EVEN IF THE ACTS OF BYU EMPLOYEES WERE ACTIONABLE 
UNDER TORT OR CIVIL RIGHTS THEORIES, THEY WOULD NOT 
THEREBY CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE CONTRACT. 
The bulk of Mr. Raiser's argument in this appeal is dedicated to his proposition 
that the University's actions were unlawful under the common law of torts, or under 
Federal constitutional or statutory provisions, and that as such, they constitute a de facto 
violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. App. Br. at 9-19. This is a 
position that simply has no support in reason or precedent. A plaintiff does not state a 
claim for breach of contract simply by alleging that the other party has committed torts. 
If the University has committed torts or other unlawful acts, Mr. Raiser can file a claim 
for relief based on those theories. As a matter of fact, Raiser has filed separate claims in State 
12 
and Federal court under each of the tort and federal law theories he argues in his appeal. See, 
e.g., R. 61-48. However, he has not included a claim for relief under any of those theories in this 
case, and he has resisted the University's attempts to consolidate those claims with this case in a 
single forum. See R. 27, 45, 91. To the extent that his tort and federal claims can be proved, Mr. 
Raiser may be entitled to an appropriate remedy, but the question of whether the University 
committed these unlawful acts is immaterial to the claims for breach of contract and covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing that Raiser has alleged in this case. 
The closest Raiser comes to showing a breach of contract in the alleged torts of the 
University is to claim that the University's allegedly tortious conduct caused him 
emotional turmoil which prevented him from fully enjoying the fruits of his contract. 
App. Br. at 12, 22. If this case were allowed to go forward on such a theory, it would 
establish a precedent to the effect that any action by one party to a contract that had the 
effect of emotionally upsetting the other party, however irrationally, would constitute a 
breach of the parties' contract. This would expand the duties a person undertakes upon 
entering into a contract beyond recognition and beyond reason. Such a precedent would 
do irreparable violence to the basic premise of contract law, because parties to a contract 
could not anticipate what actions on their part might be construed as a breach. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held, "we will not interpret the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to make a better contract for the parties than they 
made for themselves. Nor will we construe the covenant 'to establish new, independent 
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties.'" Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30 
U 19, 996 P.2d 1043 (citations omitted). The duties and obligations Mr. Raiser seeks to 
13 
impose on BYU are wholly unrelated to the contractual terms of the Settlement 
Agreement. The Court should not permit him to bring his contract claim based on 
allegations of implied contractual duties that were never agreed upon by the parties and 
which do not exist. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD DAMAGES AGAINST MR. RAISER 
BECAUSE HIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS. 
Mr. Raiser's appeal is not warranted by existing law, and he makes no attempt to 
argue for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Rather, he argues, 
through a tortured legal analysis, that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
must be so broadly construed as to find a breach of contract in any violation of "the laws 
of the land" by any person who happens to be a party to a contract. App. Br. at 12. His 
appeal is "frivolous" within the meaning of Rule 33, and the University is entitled to "just 
damages, which may include single or double costs,. . . and/or reasonable attorney fees." 
Utah R. App. P. 33(a). 
Moreover, an award of damages is required in this instance to prevent Mr. Raiser 
from continuing to file frivolous lawsuits. The courts, as a general proposition, grant a 
certain amount of leniency and indulgence to pro se plaintiffs. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has also held that a pro se plaintiff, by his persistent abuse of the judicial 
system, can lose this privilege: 
Where an individual avails [him]self of the judicial 
machinery as a matter of routine, special lenience on the basis 
of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate. This is 
particularly true where the filings in question are routinely 
frivolous and have been brought with the apparent purpose, or 
at least effect, of harassment, not only of opposing parties, but 
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of the judicial machinery itself.... Where [Plaintiff] has 
chosen to make legal self-representation a full-time hobby, if 
not a career, it is not too much to expect [him] to strictly 
abide by the rules governing the appearance of parties before 
this court. 
Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, fflj 4-5, 67 P.3d 1000. 
Aaron Raiser, like the plaintiff in Lundahl, has made a hobby or career of filing 
frivolous lawsuits. BYU is aware of 16 lawsuits he has filed in the State of Utah, 
including 15 in the past five years. Nine of these lawsuits have been filed in State courts 
(Utah 4th D. Ct. Nos. 96001179, 990400300, 990400717, 000401229, 000401590, 
000403959, 010402323, 020403144 (this case), and 020403619), and seven have been 
filed in Federal District Court (Utah D. Ct. Nos. 2:00cv00434, 2:01cv00876, 
2:01cv00894, 2:01cv00916, 2:02cv00523, 2:02cv00975, and 2:02cv01209). The current 
case is only one of five lawsuits Mr. Raiser has filed against BYU within a period of 
three years. Other defendants include Provo City, Orem City, Utah County, the Federal 
Government, and one of Mr. Raiser's roommates. 
All of the lawsuits Raiser has filed against BYU have been frivolous, and have 
been accompanied by a flurry of frivolous motions. Mr. Raiser's sole apparent motive in 
filing these lawsuits is to harass the University for the purpose of obtaining a favorable 
settlement. The University has attempted to deal patiently with Mr. Raiser in the past by 
not pressing charges in criminal actions and by settling civil disputes, but as this case 
demonstrates, settlement with Mr. Raiser has not proved an effective way of ending 
litigation. Mr. Raiser has consistently ignored his obligations under past settlement 
agreements by resurrecting previously dismissed claims in new lawsuits, and has 
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apparently been encouraged by previous settlements to file additional claims based on 
imagined harms. The University therefore requests that the Court impose damages on 
Mr. Raiser, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 33, as a disincentive for his persistent and 
harassing abuse of the judicial system. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of the district 
court dismissing Mr. Raiser's claims in this matter, with prejudice. In addition, the Court 
should award damages to Defendant B YU in the form of attorney fees and costs to be 
assessed by the district court. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 2003. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
Erik G. Davis 
Attorney for Brigham Young University 
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